On Peer Reviewed Science

[andreasmaaan]

The Science Council's definition of science is:

Science is the pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence.

Very broad. Do they mean literally any systematic methodology based on evidence? Or is this phrase further defined in their literature? (A link would be interesting)

 

[Cosmik]

Very broad. Do they mean literally any systematic methodology based on evidence? Or is this phrase further defined in their literature? (A link would be interesting)

Sorry, I forgot the link:
https://sciencecouncil.org/about-science/our-definition-of-science/

 

[SIY]

I never heard of them before, so poked around their site.

https://sciencecouncil.org/about-us/

This had me laughing. Hard. Is this seriously a thing in GB?

 

[oivavoi]

@oivavoi is a scientist, though in the social sciences - that some don’t hold in high esteem

Disclaimer: The social area (which is almost everything) is in my view undoubtedly worthy of scientific efforts. Admittedly, though, there is much nonsense in this field, which - I believe - is a reflection of the fact that the social sciences are the most complex and demanding ones.

PS: Where is @oivavoi ? Vacation?

Oivavoi is indeed on vacation! Or more precisely, I’m spending my vacation renovating our new house, and eventually moving to it. No worries, I will be back in due time

 

[Wombat]

I found the Wiki summary more clear than the Science Council,UK, site.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_Council

In Australia we call it a peak body. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/peak_body

 

[SIY]

Ah, so a lobbying group for taxpayer funding.

 

[Blumlein 88]

Now this is what I find when asking questions about science. I am not a scientist per se (I have a scientific degree qualification), but I do use science in my day-to-day living. I find that if I ask a question regarding science looked at from the outside, scientists are very hostile! (I am assuming that your somewhat cryptic answer above is directed at me, and implying that I am talking nonsense..?)


The first example of such a paper that comes up in google is this one:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187705091500719X



This is a relatively simple one, but obviously there are no limits on how complex such a model could be.

This reminds of something in that Weinberg book. The Ptolemaic system with an earth centered universe was held to for quite some time after the Copernican sun centered idea was widely known. The sun centered model didn't really supplant an earth centered model for almost 150 years. Mostly then because of refinements by Kepler. Including Kepler's laws and his unraveling of the fact orbits were elliptical.

The reason the Copernican model didn't sweep away the earth centered idea is partly a modeling problem. By the Renaissance various fine tuning methods of the Ptolemaic system made it rather accurate at predicting the motions of celestial objects. There were many fine tunings to make the model match observation. Its accuracy however made those using the system confident in it. There were epicycles, epicycles on epicycles and equants and other special conditions. It worked very accurately as a predictive model even though it was fundamentally wrong.

The Copernican idea was simpler and generally accurate. Yet because perfectly round orbits were assumed it too needed some fine tuning to match observations. Initially not being equally accurate. The fact it needed fewer special conditions and adjustments is what swayed some people. It really wasn't until Kepler working on making the Copernican universe more accurately match observation that he had the idea of elliptical orbits. Which worked, has additional explanatory power and was more accurate than either system without requiring these fine tuning add ons to work. This is when people gave up the idea of an earth centered universe. Even though Tycho Brahe, who compiled data Kepler was using, was never convinced to give up on the Ptolemaic system and argued strongly in its rightness.

So models like in your example can work, have predictive ability and still be either wrong or explaining much less than at first might seem to be the case. In the sense of being falsifiable The Ptolemaic system made predictions. The predictions were correct. The explanations for those predictions and the assumed manner of working were wrong, and yet the model had been made to fit observation.

 

[andreasmaaan]

I think a key distinction should be made between a theory and an hypothesis.

A theory is more universal; it seeks to explain and integrate a range of observations in a way that is both internally consistent and consistent with those observations.

An hypothesis can be thought of as a more specific proposition that may be derived from or implied by a theory, and that is capable of being falsified by experimentation.

If an hypothesis is (repeatedly) falsified, it normally doesn't immediately lead to a theory being refuted or abandoned. Rather, attempts will be made to refine the theory so that it produces new hypotheses that (apparently) cannot be falsified.

Often, new observations are made (often incidentally) that appear to be in tension with a theory. Scientists may then try to develop hypotheses and experiments based on prevailing theories that seek to investigate these further, which may lead to refinement of the theory(ies) from which the hypotheses are derived. Ultimately, a theory may be abandoned, but as the example given by @Blumlein 88 demonstrates, this tends to be a gradual and/or erratic process. A new theory that turns out to supersede the previous one may not initially do a better job at explaining the observations (it may need significant refinement), or it may not arise until long after a prevailing theory seems to be doing a poor job of explaining the observations.

Underlying this whole dynamic process are various cultural (e.g. social, economic and political) factors. On a more orthodox view, these cultural factors are a kind of background story that may either aid or inhibit the proper (normal, determinate) development of better theories.

On a more radical view, the development and ultimate acceptance or rejection of new theories is fundamentally a cultural process (the classic example of this view comes from Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in which the phrase "paradigm shift" was coined). On this view, there is nothing necessarily determinate (in the sense of new theories/discoveries logically and progressively building upon the old) about the unfolding of science.

 

[SIY]

Ultimately, a theory may be abandoned, but as the example given by @Blumlein 88 demonstrates, this tends to be a gradual and/or erratic process. A new theory that turns out to supersede the previous one may not initially do a better job at explaining the observations (it may need significant refinement), or it may not arise until long after a prevailing theory seems to be doing a poor job of explaining the observations.

Or it may be something that sounds wild and has no evidentiary support. Think of Wegener, for example. When suddenly there was evidence, albeit many decades later, his theory went from novel obscurity to predominance.

 

[andreasmaaan]

Or it may be something that sounds wild and has no evidentiary support. Think of Wegener, for example. When suddenly there was evidence, albeit many decades later, his theory went from novel obscurity to predominance.

An interesting example, because on one hand Wegener's theory initially didn't do a better job of explaining the observations (few relevant observations had been made yet, and Wegener's estimate of the rate of drift was in any case off by a factor of 100), while on the other hand there was arguably strong cultural resistance among the geological establishment (according to wikipedia part of this was to do with the "dogmatic style that often results from German translations" - lol).

 

[Cosmik]

Article in today's Guardian:
Our job as scientists is to find the truth. But we must also be storytellers

...writing in a narrative style increases uptake of scientific results....

...a good story will have a meaning, a relatable moral with universal resonance for audiences.

...If we believe that we have the right story, then we should tell it. Only then can it be evaluated. Because science is a collective enterprise, our stories will succeed when they are validated by broad agreement in our community.

...Our audiences need stories. So we must tell the right stories about our findings, if we are going to treat those findings with the respect they need.

I think we know what this means. Subjectivity. Making science about feelings and morality. Turning science into another branch of politics. Making science politically correct. Making 'community' consensus on the the story the criterion for "successful" science.

 

[Blumlein 88]

Article in today's Guardian:
Our job as scientists is to find the truth. But we must also be storytellers

I think we know what this means. Subjectivity. Making science about feelings and morality. Turning science into another branch of politics. Making science politically correct. Making consensus on the the story the criterion for "successful" science.

To me, this says "Shun the scientists whose findings contradict what we know to be right and moral and true. Their 'story' is wrong. Go easy on those scientists who toe the line and tell the right story."

I don't agree. At least not necessarily. The topic is helping scientists present the findings of science in a way that people would listen. Not changing the science, not even changing the underlying facts of what you report or advise. Simply learning how most lay people will get the message you have more clearly or in a format they find easy to digest.

If people learn from a story, as much as possible tell things in a story form. Use what is known about written works of fiction and story line building in successful movies to present your ideas. You can follow a made up plot ignoring reality, but sometimes you can work on telling a story about reality to get something across. I don't see anything wrong with that.

 

[Cosmik]

The topic is helping scientists present the findings of science in a way that people would listen.

Is the purpose of science to make people listen? If so, then storytelling should be part of the education of scientists. But I would have thought that it was other people who were supposed to take the findings of science (like politicians) and weave a narrative from it. (Even if that isn't always the way it works).

This article to me, smacks of the idea that scientists should be encouraged to become little politicians and campaigners themselves. It might almost be a coded way of saying that in a world of rising populism and people-power, the intelligentsia/elite must start to assert more direct influence.

Edit: Ha! If I look at the author of that piece's other contribution to The Guardian it is this:
https://www.theguardian.com/comment...ing-trust-and-accountability-it-cant-end-well
I promise I didn't see that before I posted my above comment. It pretty much confirms my suspicions..!

Those who prevailed have exploited the tension between ideals of equal access on the one hand, and deference to expertise on the other. While we might debate the wisdom of trusting political insiders, the suspicion of specialists and experts has begun to contaminate a much bigger ecology of knowledge and practice in our society.

I think he is saying exactly what I said above. "Equal access" means that wicked people can weave any narrative they like from science, and they may prevail over the good people because they tell a good story. It is the duty of scientists (who will, because they are intelligent etc., mainly be good people) to weave the narrative before it can be got at by the wicked people. Make it so that scientific findings cannot be misused (as they would see it) by wicked people, but pre-load it with the right political stories to start with.

 

[Cosmik]

The link between these two articles is clear, I would say. But in the second article the author does not acknowledge the first.
https://www.theguardian.com/comment...ing-trust-and-accountability-it-cant-end-well
https://www.theguardian.com/comment...nd-the-truth-but-we-must-also-be-storytellers

Science can’t exist without telling a story. The question is not whether we should use it, but how we should use it best

I think he is developing the arguments in the first article in coded form, suggesting that scientists must become political themselves. They must pre-load their findings with a political narrative that means the facts cannot be misused by the 'wrong' politicians. If a scientist's work could be interpreted as suggesting that polar bears are thriving and therefore developed into an argument that global warming isn't happening, they should weave it into 'a story' that says that in a wider context the population is still in decline because of changes in climate, etc.

Scientists are being encouraged to become miniature politicians themselves.

 

[SIY]

Nick Enfield is head of the Post-Truth Initiative and director of the Sydney Social Sciences and Humanities Advanced Research Centre at the University of Sydney

That should explain things.

Scientists are being encouraged to become miniature politicians themselves.

When science meets politics, it's science that gets t-boned.

 

[svart-hvitt]

@Cosmik , I think you are off in your understanding of the narrative, stories and science. Are you talking about the «hard» sciences only, or the «soft» ones too? Hey! What is really soft and what is hard?

In audio we often talk about «colour». That’s a practical analogy to tell a complex story. In my view.

One of my favorite social scientists is Danish Oxford professor Bent Flyvbjerg. Let me quote one of his recent comments:

«ON GOOD AND BAD STORYTELLING IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

'Paul Krugman dismisses Hirschman as a “novelist” who “seduces people” by the “richness of plain English” (Krugman 1994: 287; Rodwin 1994: 11). This is a harsh assessment, and it has been countered by Tendler (1994: 289), who maintains that “Hirschman is more than a ‘storyteller’.” Rodwin (1994: 11) has similarly, and rightly, identified Krugman’s critique as self-defeating, because Krugman employs extensive storytelling to argue his point; in effect using storytelling to reject storytelling, which does not hold up in the court of methodological consistency, needless to say. But Krugman’s and Tendler’s viewpoints are both based on the false assumption that “storytelling” is a second-rate methodology in social science. To many, however, storytelling, or narrative, is one of the most powerful methods in the toolbox of social scientists, which is why even Krugman uses it, when it really counts. Witness the fact that many of the most treasured classics in each social science discipline are based on storytelling (Flyvbjerg 2001, 2011). But storytelling is just one method among many, and it may be done well or less well, like other methods. The problem with Hirschman is not storytelling as such; the problem is bad storytelling. If Hirschman had honored normal social science standards for validity and reliability in sampling, data collection, and analysis, he would have produced a valid and reliable narrative about his observations. Instead he violated basic rules of research and, as a consequence, produced an invalid and unreliable study. To this extent Krugman’s critique is justified. But this has nothing to do with storytelling, even if Hirschman’s is the type of work that gives storytelling a bad name. Instead it has everything to do with garbage-in- garbage-out, which applies to any methodology.'»

So Flyvbjerg introduces the distinction of «bad storytelling» from storytelling as one method among many others.

Flyvbjerg is a strong advocate for «phronesis». Everyone should look up what he’s written about it (Wikipedia is shallow). His point is: It’s complicated and only training makes a fine scientist, a master of practical wisdom.

 

[Cosmik]

@Cosmik , I think you are off in your understanding of the narrative, stories and science. Are you talking about the «hard» sciences only, or the «soft» ones too? Hey! What is really soft and what is hard?

In audio we often talk about «colour». That’s a practical analogy to tell a complex story. In my view.

One of my favorite social scientists is Danish Oxford professor Bent Flyvbjerg. Let me quote one of his recent comments:

«ON GOOD AND BAD STORYTELLING IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

'Paul Krugman dismisses Hirschman as a “novelist” who “seduces people” by the “richness of plain English” (Krugman 1994: 287; Rodwin 1994: 11). This is a harsh assessment, and it has been countered by Tendler (1994: 289), who maintains that “Hirschman is more than a ‘storyteller’.” Rodwin (1994: 11) has similarly, and rightly, identified Krugman’s critique as self-defeating, because Krugman employs extensive storytelling to argue his point; in effect using storytelling to reject storytelling, which does not hold up in the court of methodological consistency, needless to say. But Krugman’s and Tendler’s viewpoints are both based on the false assumption that “storytelling” is a second-rate methodology in social science. To many, however, storytelling, or narrative, is one of the most powerful methods in the toolbox of social scientists, which is why even Krugman uses it, when it really counts. Witness the fact that many of the most treasured classics in each social science discipline are based on storytelling (Flyvbjerg 2001, 2011). But storytelling is just one method among many, and it may be done well or less well, like other methods. The problem with Hirschman is not storytelling as such; the problem is bad storytelling. If Hirschman had honored normal social science standards for validity and reliability in sampling, data collection, and analysis, he would have produced a valid and reliable narrative about his observations. Instead he violated basic rules of research and, as a consequence, produced an invalid and unreliable study. To this extent Krugman’s critique is justified. But this has nothing to do with storytelling, even if Hirschman’s is the type of work that gives storytelling a bad name. Instead it has everything to do with garbage-in- garbage-out, which applies to any methodology.'»

So Flyvbjerg introduces the distinction of «bad storytelling» from storytelling as one method among many others.

Flyvbjerg is a strong advocate for «phronesis». Everyone should look up what he’s written about it (Wikipedia is shallow). His point is: It’s complicated and only training makes a fine scientist, a master of practical wisdom.

I think you are talking from your specialised knowledge of how science *is* - and of course it has never been purely objective and divorced from wider 'narratives'. But do you think there is nothing in the two articles combined that hints at a shift towards scientists taking on more of a role of wider storyteller for 'political' reasons?

Science can’t exist without telling a story. The question is not whether we should use it, but how we should use it best.

What does that last phrase mean? I think 'it' refers to the science, and the quote is suggesting that 'we', the 'scientific community', should be actively deciding on how 'our' science shall (and shall not) be used. The story is the means by which 'we' can do that.

Democracy has failed, and the intelligentsia/elite must use all the tools at their disposal to save the people from themselves - is the idea.

 

[svart-hvitt]

I think you are talking from your specialised knowledge of how science *is* - and of course it has never been purely objective and divorced from wider 'narratives'. But do you think there is nothing in the two articles combined that hints at a shift towards scientists taking on more of a role of wider storyteller for 'political' reasons?

What does that last phrase mean? I think 'it' refers to the science, and the quote is suggesting that 'we', the 'scientific community', should be actively deciding on how 'our' science shall (and shall not) be used. The story is the means by which 'we' can do that.

Democracy has failed, and the intelligentsia/elite must use all the tools at their disposal to save the people from themselves - is the idea.

I think - but am not certain - that I understand your point. And I suspect we agree on the big picture.

But I think @Wombat ’s position «never use analogies» and your position «never use storytelling» (did I understand the two of you correctly?) is too strong, too one-sided.

The less a science has to deal with the theorization (definitions) and commensurability (measurements) problem, the less need for analogies and storytelling, I guess. As complexity increases - say we are dealing with pure philosophy - analogies and storytelling are natural. In between, say between biology and social sciences, I believe analogies and storytelling will (must) be more common. In audio? Because psychoacoustics must be part of the audio discipline, we use analogies (say «colour») and storytelling.

As usual, bad forces (let’s call it evil, for good measure) will always try to gain power. And evil will try and distort, manipulate, confuse and use other tricks to win. In audio, this means in most cases that profits come before integrity, and the customer loses.

So I agree with Flyvbjerg’s position that we have good and we have bad storytelling. Understanding bad storytelling is very interesting, almost like a detective story of Agatha Christie. Because behind bad storytelling may lie a story (sic!) just waiting to be told; cfr. «The naked emperor».

Did my text make sense? Did we get any closer?

 

[andreasmaaan]

I think there will always be someone telling a story about the science. Whether it's journalists, politicians or social media users, if the science makes it out of the lab, it will become #content.

If this is the case, then it's actually in the interests of dispassionate science to make attempts to define the "story" from the outset.

I see this to be the gist of the article, anyway.

 

[Cosmik]

If this is the case, then it's actually in the interests of dispassionate science to make attempts to define the "story" from the outset.

I don't agree. Dispassionate science doesn't care what other stories people make from it. Nor does it have 'interests'. (Being very purist of course).

But yes, I think what you say is the gist of the article - I just don't agree with it!