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I’m kind of an armchair philosopher. I came across this paper and thought I would take a shot at summarizing. It seems relevant to the community, and I didn’t see it mentioned in depth anywhere.
You may be familiar with the research paper by Frédéric Brochet ( “La dégustation: Étude des représentations des objets chimiques dans le champ de la conscience” (2001) in which trained oenology students used red-wine vocabulary to describe a white wine that had been dyed red. Contrary to popular legend, Brochet does not interpret this as proof that wine experts are frauds, that tasting is meaningless, or that wine quality is imaginary.
Instead, he concludes that vision strongly influences olfactory representation, that this influence operates below conscious awareness, and that the effect is a genuine perceptual illusion rather than dishonesty or incompetence. It is not, however, in any way, a direct measurement of chemical reality. The difference is ontological (reality), not phenomenological (sensory).
He goes further to point out that perception does not equal measurement. Brochet is raising the ‘hard’ problem of cognizance and consciousness. What we experience in the neurons of our brain is not the actual sound energy hitting our eardrum (although Reductivism would conveniently make that true, few are convinced.)
Brochet notes that wine tasting expertise is real. It just relies on learned patterns and is demonstrated through language, memory, and categorization. It can even be objectively studied. It’s more about recognizing patterns than quantifying substances.
If Brochet is right, the approach can be easily applied to (trained) subjectivist audiophiles, who might, for instance, genuinely believe they are hearing a cryogenically lowered noise floor in the cable. Both wine tasting and audiophile listening involve genuine human perceptual experiences that are strongly shaped by tradition, cognition, and expectation —yet are often mistaken for direct detection of objective, unmeasured physical properties.
If an audiophile said to Brochet “Measurements don’t capture what I’m hearing.” He would say ‘That’s correct. Measurements can’t capture experience.”
But he wouldn’t invalidate what the audiophile thinks he heard.
You may be familiar with the research paper by Frédéric Brochet ( “La dégustation: Étude des représentations des objets chimiques dans le champ de la conscience” (2001) in which trained oenology students used red-wine vocabulary to describe a white wine that had been dyed red. Contrary to popular legend, Brochet does not interpret this as proof that wine experts are frauds, that tasting is meaningless, or that wine quality is imaginary.
Instead, he concludes that vision strongly influences olfactory representation, that this influence operates below conscious awareness, and that the effect is a genuine perceptual illusion rather than dishonesty or incompetence. It is not, however, in any way, a direct measurement of chemical reality. The difference is ontological (reality), not phenomenological (sensory).
He goes further to point out that perception does not equal measurement. Brochet is raising the ‘hard’ problem of cognizance and consciousness. What we experience in the neurons of our brain is not the actual sound energy hitting our eardrum (although Reductivism would conveniently make that true, few are convinced.)
Brochet notes that wine tasting expertise is real. It just relies on learned patterns and is demonstrated through language, memory, and categorization. It can even be objectively studied. It’s more about recognizing patterns than quantifying substances.
If Brochet is right, the approach can be easily applied to (trained) subjectivist audiophiles, who might, for instance, genuinely believe they are hearing a cryogenically lowered noise floor in the cable. Both wine tasting and audiophile listening involve genuine human perceptual experiences that are strongly shaped by tradition, cognition, and expectation —yet are often mistaken for direct detection of objective, unmeasured physical properties.
If an audiophile said to Brochet “Measurements don’t capture what I’m hearing.” He would say ‘That’s correct. Measurements can’t capture experience.”
But he wouldn’t invalidate what the audiophile thinks he heard.